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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DAWN W. HORNE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 20187

W. REID HORNE,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATE OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FQR REVIEW
May the trial court, upon finding of good cause, enter
Nunc Pro Tunc to the date of settlement agreement an order of
distribution of property and other related matters as originally
presented and read into the record on the 20th day of June,
1984?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. S 30-4a-l (Supp. 1983):
Authority of Court. A court having jurisdiction may, upon
its finding of good cause and giving of such notice as may be
ordered, enter an order Nunc Pro Tunc is a matter relating to
marriage, divorce, legal separation or annulment of marriage.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case
This is the reply to an appeal of the trial court's entry
Nunc Pro Tunc in a matter relating to a divorce.
only one issue at dispute here.

There is really

It is an argument over the

tax consequences of a divorce.

Course of Proceedings
On June 20, 1984, the parties entered into a property settlement
and that settlement was read into the record in Judge's chambers
with counsel and parties present.

Judge Rigtrup asked each

party if they understood the settlement and agreed to be bound
by it.

Each party answered yes.

For all practical purposes, the agreement was in effect
and each party set about doing those things as required by the
settlement.

The transfer of the Townhouse Court Apartments

took place and was effective on July 1, 1984.
The dispute arose when defendant wanted language added
to the agreement that the agreement constituted an attempt to
equalize the marital assets of the parties. This was inconsistent
with the facts.
The total fair market value of the property received by
each spouse was not equal.
Mrs. Home did.

Mr. Home received much more than

In a noncommunity property state, such as Utah,

the property must be jointly owned.
owned.

The property was separately

The Townhouse Court Apartments were owned by Mr. Home

-2-

prior to the couples marriage.

(Under the tax law prior to

July 18/ 1984/ an equal division of property that was co-owned
did not result in gain or loss).
Failing to have the untrue tax language added to the documents/
Mr. H o m e

and his counsel refused to cooperate in any way and

delayed the matter for several weeks.

Disposition in the Court Below
On August 17/ 1984/ the court entered its Order of Property
Division Nunc Pro Tunc to June 20, 1984 that being the day the
settlement was made and could have been signed/ dated/ filed
and entered.

Facts
Plaintiff/ Dawn W. Home, and defendant W. Reid Home were
married on January 17 r 1970.

Plaintiff filed for divorce on

February 19/ 1980. On January 27/ 1984/ the parties were divorced.
Plaintiff and defendant brought substantial premarital
property into the marriage, and the parties accumulated substantial
property during the marriage.

After plaintiff filed for divorce,

defendant disposed of a very large portion of the parties property.
In November of 1981/ defendant sold his nephew and partner his
half interest in Larry H. Miller Toyota of Salt Lake and eleven
other entities for a fraction of their value.
of various large equipment and real property.
nothing from the sales.

-3-

He also disposed
Plaintiff received

Trial of the division of property portion of the case began
on June 19, 1984, and was scheduled to run four days.

On the

second day of the trial, parties entered into negotiations and
reached a settlement agreement.

Plaintiff wished to continue

with the trial but was urged by her attorneys to accept settlement.
She was advised that by taking the older premarital property,
she would have the tax advantage of the stepped up basis and
that by settling by stipulation, the matter would be settled
once and for all, without possibility of appeal.
Under the law at the time, the defendant had a tax liability
for capital gains on the property up to the date of transfer
and the plaintiff had no gain or loss on the transaction.

The

basis of the property to the plaintiff would be its fair market
value on the date of transfer.

It is very important to the

plaintiff to have the stepped up basis.
Under the law at the time, an equal division of property
that was co-owned was not a taxable event.

This settlement

was not an equal division and the property was not jointly owned
and thus, the exception to the Davis rule was not applicable.
The Court approved the settlement and requested plaintiff's
counsel to prepare an appropriate order.

Plaintiff's counsel

submitted to defendant's counsel, proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Order of Distribution of Real and
Personal Property, Payment of Debts, Support, Attorney's Fees
and Other Related Matters on the 29th day of June, 1984, pursuant
to the stipulation of the parties read into the record on the
20th day of June, 1984.
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Counsel for the defendant returned said documents approximately
two (2) weeks later requesting certain changes that did not
conform with the agreement reached by the palrties.
Minor changes were made to the plaintiff's proposed Findings,
Conclusions and Order and sent on to the Court for signature.
Thereafter , an informal conference was held with the Court in
chambers, and the Court concluded a transcri|pt of the proceedings
was necessary and that the matter should} be continued until
said transcript was obtained.
Plaintiff's review of the transcript of the decision as
stipulated to by the parties in open Court and read into the
record, is in conformity with the Findings ofi Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Order of Distribution of Real and Personal Property,
Payment of Debts, Support, Attorney's Fees and Other Related
Matters first submitted to the Court by plaintiff's counsel.
(A copy of said transcript is attached hereto and made a part
hereof by reference).
Defendant's contention that the stipulation was to include
certain tax assumptions and consequences is not supported by
said transcript and said objections should be denied.
At the time of reading of the Stipulation into the record,
United States v. Davis was the law of the l^nd and in full force
and effect.

Plaintiff's negotiations relied upon the law set

forth in that case and the agreement reache4 at that time should
be adopted herein and the Plaintiff should have the benefit
of the stepped up basis on said properties foif which she bargained.

-5-

On or about July 18, 1984, the Tax Reform Act of 1984 was
signed into law by President Reagan.

Said Act abolished the

holding of United States v. Davis, and any Decree signed on
or after the 18th of July, 1984 would literally wipe out what
the plaintiff had bargained for and received by her agreement
necessitating the entry of the Findings, Conclusions and Order
Nunc Pro Tunc as of the 20th day of June, 1984, the date judgment
was rendered in said matter.

Summary of Argument
This is a matter relating to divorce and the Court clearly
has the authority to enter an Order Nunc Pro Tunc.
Good cause existed to enter the Nunc Pro Tunc Order.

At

the time of reading of the Stipulation into the record, United
States v. Davis was the law of the land and in full force and
effect.

Respondent's negotiations relied upon the law set forth

in that case and respondent should have the benefit of the stepped
up basis on said properties for which she bargained and to which
appellant agreed to.
Appellant deliberately delayed signing of the agreement
in order to benefit from the change in the tax law.

The Nunc

Pro Tunc Order by Judge Rigtrup is to correct that injustice.

-6-

ARGUMENT
Appellant's Arguments are Inconsistent With the Facts
POINT I
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT: THE LOWER COURTfS ENTRY
OF THE NUNC PRO TUNC WAS IMPROPER IN THAT THE
ORDER INCORPORATED SUBSTANTIVE RULINGS MADE
AFTER THE PARTIES1 AGREEMENT.
Fact:

The changes Judge Rigtrup made were to correct the

record to "speak the truth", and correctly represent the agreement
read to the Court on June 20, 1984, and to which all parties
agreed to. This Nunc Pro Tunc Order was a reflection of a previously
made ruling in which no reference was made to the tax consequences.
If you will refer to reporter's transcript of June 20,
1984, in the addendum you will see that the Order of August
17th correctly reflects the events of June 20, 1984.
The Preece case in which Mrs. Preece sought to become a
widow instead of a divorcee and won, doles not apply to this
case.

POINT II
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT; THE LOWER COURT'S ENTRY
OF ITS ORDER WENT BEYOND THE SCOPE OF ITS
STATUTORY AUTHORITY.
Fact:

A Court having jurisdiction may, upon its finding

of good cause and giving of such notice as may be ordered, enter
an order Nunc Pro Tunc in a matter relating to marriage, divorce,
legal separation or annulment of marriage.
30-4a-l (Utah 1983).

-7-

Utah Code Ann, S

This is a matter relating to divorce.
to enter the Order Nunc Pro Tunc.

There was good cause

For all practical purposes,

the Order was in effect on June 20, 1984, and each party set
about doing those things as required by the settlement.

POINT III
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT: EVEN IF ENTRY OF THE
ORDER NUNC PRO TUNC WAS OTHERWISE PROPER, THE
COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED THE NUNC PRO TUNC
MOTION IN EXCHANGE FOR PLAINTIFFS ABANDONMENT
OF THE CHARGES OF MISCONDUCT.
Fact;

Plaintiff never "filed charges" of misconduct, not

with the Court and not with the bar.
The hearing of August 8, 1984 was for one purpose only,
it was on a motion by plaintiff to change counsel.

Plaintiff

had never filed charges against her counsel and was only explaining
why she wished to change counsel if in fact the case was not
over and needed to go back to trial.
Mr. Gustin, of Gustin, Adams, Kasting & Liapis, argued
that the case was over on June 20, 1984, and that the only purpose
of changing counsel was to cheat their firm out of attorney
fees.
The Court ruled that the case was over on June 20, 1984
and that there was no tax language in that agreement and Mrs. Home
should have the benefit of the stepped up basis for which she
had bargained and which was clearly the law of the land at that
time.

Plaintiff was willing to drop her request for a change

-8-

of counsel if the case was indeed over with on June 20, 1984.
A reading of the transcript of August 8, 1984 will prove
appellants argument is totally inconsistant yith the facts.

CONCLUSION
I ask you to let Judge Rigtrup's Nunc Pto Tunc ruling stand.
Under the circumstances it is a fair and proper ruling.
To overturn the Nunc Pro Tunc is to allow appellant to
make a settlement under the old tax law and then failing to
later have some untrue tax language put into the settlement,
allow him to use delay tactics to delay final signing several
weeks so that he could take advantage of the new tax law and
deprive Mrs. H o m e

of the tax advantage she had bargained for

under the original agreement.
In addition, the issue may be moot.

The 1984 Tax Reform

Act applies to transfers after July 18, 1984.

The transfer

of the Townhouse Court Apartments took plape and was effective
on July 1, 1984.

Whether you rule for or Against the Nunc Pro

Tunc, the final decision on this tax matter will rest with the
Internal Revenue Service.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

lift
*1

day of January, 1985.

DAWN W. HORNE

gy

UouAsn^

tl}\<

^ft/Tsnji^

Dawn W. Horhe
Plaintiff-Respondent
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ADDENDUM
1.

Internal Revenue Service publication 504 (Rev. Nov. 1983).

2.

1984 Tax Reform Act.

3.

Reporter's Partial Transcript of June 29, 1984.
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Jane's rights that she gave up are treated as
equal in value to the fair market value of the
property she receives for them ($80,000). Jim
has a taxable gain of $40,000 ($80,000 fair market value less $40,000 basis). Jane has no gain
or loss. Her basis in the property is $80,000.
Jointly owned property. Property that is held by
you and your spouse as joint tenants with right
of survivorship, tenants by the entirety, or tenants in common, each having an undivided half
interest, is considered jointly owned. If such
property is equally divided by the spouses incident to divorce, there is no taxable gain or loss.
Community property. In a community property
state (Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, or Washington) an
equal division of community property in connection with divorce is not a taxable exchange.
It does not matter which spouse actually holds
title to the property.
Property treated as jointly owned. Although
they are not community property states, some
states treat property received during marriage
as marital property. Such property is treated ^s
held by a type of common ownership even i
though title is in the name of only one of the
spouses. In such a case, the state property law
is controlling. A division of the property in these
states may be treated for federal tax purposes
in the same way as a division Of community
property ...States that require an equitable distribution of property between the spouses do npt
come under this rule.
"
~~

proximately equal division of community property or jointly owned property is the same as it*
basis to the community or when it was jointly
owned. If a particular asset is divided between
the spouses, each spouse's basis for the part
received is the part related to the community o
jointly owned basis.
An unequal division of jointly owned property
or community property may result in gain or
loss. The gain or loss is the difference betweei
the net fair market value and the adjusted basi
The formula you must use to figure the taxabU
gain is shown in the following example.
Example. Tom and Mary are divorced. Their
total assets (money and property) include join
owned property that has a net fair market valu
of $70,000. Tom has separately owned proper
with a net fair market value of $40,000. Mary
has no separately owned property.
The divorce decree gives Mary jointly owne
property that has a net fair market value of
$55,000. Tom is awarded the rest of the joint!}
held property, which has a net fair market vali
of $15,000. He gets all of his separately owne
property, which has a net fair market value of
$40,000.

The adjusted basis of the jointly owned pro
erty received by Mary is $29,500. This include
personal furniture which has an adjusted bas
of $6,000 and a net fair market value of $4,00
3u transfer property in settlement of mariTherefore, Mary has a loss of $2,000 on the fi
hts, you may have a gain or a loss on the
> niture. Because a loss on property held for pi
er of the property. The gain or loss is the
sonal use is not deductible, Mary reduces th€
snce between the adjusted basis of the
,krty and its fair market value at the time of
ffirrappygftaately equal dn/fsToity ptQO&ftfW^ adjusted basis of the furniture by $2,000 and
ansfer. If the property has appreciated
^onnacllca win cworcc »s not a TaxaBfae*«4« * * duces the adjusted basis of all the property s
may be a taxable gain on the transfer.
? fcfthanqeyfrft,nonconmunit^pnxseftY state-ttfrerp received to $27,500.
*rty has appreciated if its fair market value
pro P6*1y- mttstlaeIbirUly. owned^ lrra-commumty:
The division of the jointly owned property i
re than its adjusted basis. The difference
property state j t does not matter-whicfc spouse ^ not equal. Tom gives up a part of his share c
ain. If the fair market value is less than the •"^actually holds title to the property. However^
the jointly owned property for Mary's marital
ted basis, a loss is realized. if the loss is
^property'musf^e^communitv property: ,11 ita
rights in Tom's separately owned property. T
operty held for personal use, it is not de^ js arvapproximatery equal division-of the tots
must figure his gain on the transfer He must
ble. If the loss is on business or investment jfair market valije.of-the property, some bfth<
first figure his share of the jointly owned proi
arty, it is generally deductible. However, a
"^assets may "go in their entirety to one spouse erty received by Mary as follows:
an the sale or exchange of property beand some maV go in their entirety to the other ^
v
n related parties is not deductible. For in---spOuse:with no gain~or loss being realized.
Jointly owned property received by Mary
S55
M \
ation on sales and exchanges between
"Suqh a division jVnof taxable when the total fair" Half of ail jointly owned property (1/2 of $70,000) 35
3d parties, see Publication 544, Sales and
market valueof the property rprfMvttf fry ?tir|h^
Excess jointly owned property received by Mary . S2C
r Dispositions of Assets. An equal division
spouse is equal -»•>.—„-—
operty that is co-owned by you and your
Tom determines his adjusted basis in the exExample. Harry and Edith were married in I a
ise does not result in gain or loss. Property
cess jointly owned property received by Mar
ncncomrnunity
property
state.
As
a
part
of
ttjeir
-owned if: (1) it is held jointly; (2) it is comusing this formula:
divorce,
they
agree
to
equally
divide
their
jointly
ity property; or (3) it is treated by state law
owned
property.
Harry
and
Edith
own
no
sepaeing jointly owned property. These forms of
Net fair market value
rate property.
wnership are discussed later in this sec-

perty Settlements

arately owned property. If you and your
jse each keep your separately owned propin a divorce settlement, there is no taxable
or deductible loss. If, on the other hand,
of the spouses transfers separately owned
)erty to the other spouse, the spouse transng the property realizes gain or loss. The
jrence between the fair market value of the
aerty and its adjusted basis is the gain or
.. The spouse receiving the property has no
i or loss on the transaction The basis of the
perty to the receiving spouse is its fair marvalue on the date of the transfer.

They intend to divide their property equally,
but certain assets cannot be divided because
they are associated with a particular liability; or
they are part of a business venture that can i be
managed by only one person. Therefore, some
assets are given to Harry and other assets Of
nearly equal value are given to Edith. The rest
of the assets are equally divided.
The total net fair market value of the jointly
owned property is $300,000, Harry receives assets valued at $150,258, while Edith receive^
assets worth $149,742. The difference in th£
value of the property that each receives ($^16)
is due to the property that could not be equally
divided, t o make up the difference, Harry ^ives
Edith a note for $258.
,

xample. Jim and Jane get a divorce. Under
terms of the divorce decree and a property „ u J Although Edith could consider Harry's note
lement that is included in the decree, Jim
as a sale or exchange of property rights in
isfers his separately owned interest in an
some of the assets for consideration not pert of
ulment building to Jane in consideration for
the assets (the note), it is not important enough
I in discharge of her dower rights in his reto prevent the division from being about equal.
ining property. Jim's adjusted basis in the
The transaction, therefore, is not considered a
isferred interest is $40,000. Its fair market
taxable exchange.

of excess jointly owned
property received by
Mary

— — Sf^SSl Department of the Treasury
« * ' « ™ eternal Revenue Service
prop

^ ^

Man
Thus
owne

Tax
Information t
Divorced or
»Separated
H
W
. t individuals
S20.0C
exc?

Tom

Net fan
prop
Minus:

Gain

or IOSJ

mn
i Vv Publication 504
talass(Rev. NOV. 8 3 )

1984 Tax Reform Act
Domestic Relations Provisions
Transfers of Property

Gain has generally been recognized on
certain transfers of property in exchange
for marital rights of a spouse or former
spouse. Beginning after July 13. 1S34, transfers of property between spouses or fonder
spouses, if incident to a divorce, will no ion^er
result in the recognition of gain or loss. The
basjs of« the property transferred will be
the transferor's adjusted basis.
Incident to divorce—A transfer is incident
to a divorce if it occurs within one year
after the marriage ceases or is related to
the cessation.
Election—Although this provision generally only applies to transfers aft . July
18, 1984, if both spouses or former spouses
elect, this non-recognition of gain can be
applied to transfers made after December
31, )QS3. Further, the provisions do not
appiy to transfers made after July 18, 1984
pursuant to an instrument in effect on or
before that date unless both spouses or
former spouses elect to have the ntonrccogmtion provision apply.
Alimony
Alimony is generally deductible by the
payor and includible in the income of the
payee. Beginning in 1985, only cash payments pursuant to a divorce or separation
agreement that will terminate upon the death
of the payee made between former spouses
not living in the same household will qualify
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 1984; 10:00 A. M.
-ooOoo[The Court, having conferred with counsel
and parties off the record, and negotiations having taken
place, the following proceedings were held in chambers
with counsel and parties present at 3:12 p.m.]

THE COURT:

The attorneys have advised the

Court that they have settled the outstanding issue in
this case; is that correct?
MR. LIAPIS:

That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Is that right, Mr. Crandall?
Yes, I hope so.

MR- CRANDALL:

I think

we've got it all agreed to.
THE COURT:

Will you state what the agreement]

is on the record, Mr. Liapis?
MR. LIAPIS:

Yes, I would.

Let me just

locate the checklist here.
THE COURT:

Plaintiff may have a divorce,

final on entry.
MR. LIAPIS:

That has already been entered,

your Honor.
THE COURT:

That's right.

I can't do that.

She got one in advance.
MR. LIAPIS:

With regard to the properties,

2 !

1

the plaintiff, Mrs. H o m e , will be awarded the

2

condominium which she's now residing in, the duplexes

—

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. LIAPIS:

Well, I knew you were going to

6

MRS. HORNE:

691 East 4181 South.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. LIAPIS:

9

1700 South and 1933-37 East 1700 South.

5

Where at?

ask that.

Okay.
The two duplexes at 1925-27 East
That's free and

10

clear of any interest of 1the defendant, and subject to

11

plaintiff assuming and paying the mortgage payments thereon

12
13 j

THE COURT:
mortgage payments?

Plaintiff to assume and pay

Is that what yoiu said?

14

MR. LIAPIS:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. LIAPIS:

Yes.
All right.
In addition, the plaintiff will

17 |

be awarded all right, title and interest in and to the

18

Townhouse Court apartment complex, together with all of the

19

appliances.

j

Is there any furniture in it?

20

MR. HORNE:

21

MR. LIAPIS:

No.
Appliances, deposits, rentals,

22

the whole thing.

23

exchange item to equalize the marital assets of the parties,

24

in this matter.

25

It will be transferred to her as an

MR. HORNE:

Could I mike one point?

Could

3

we have a cutoff point as of the first of the month?
MR. LIAPIS:

What is today?

MR, HORNE:

It's the 20th.

MR. LIAPIS:

That's fine.

the first of July.

Commencing with

Is that all right?

MRS. HORNE:

That's fine.

MR. LIAPIS:

Plaintiff will assume the first

mortgage payment thereon, taxes conimencing with the month
of July through the end of the year.
MR. HORNE:

The reserve account is set up

at Prudential.
MR. LIAPIS:

The reserve account likewise

will be transferred.
MR. HORNE:
MR. LIAPIS:

That will go with it.
All right.

And there is no

shortage in that reserve account?
MR. HORNE:

No, there's $833 at the first

of the year that was left over, so
MR. LIAPIS:

—

And there have been payments

made?
MR. HORNE:

It's been made every month.

There should be an overage, not an underage.
MR. LIAPIS:

In addition, the plaintiff will

be awarded the vacant lot at 6716 13th East as her sole
and separate property, free and clear of any interest of

4

1 j

the d e f e n d a n t .

2

3

Defendant will be awarded, by way of

properties —

let me start at the front.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. LIAPIS:

Awarded all other real

property?

A l l the r e s t , w h i c h w o u l d

6

include, for the Court's n o t e s , the Suzie-Q A p a r t m e n t s ,

7

the Elm Avenue five-plex, the Townhouse Villa complex,

8

the T o w n h o u s e II c o m p l e x , t h e o f f i c e a n d w a r e h o u s e

9

t h e E d i s o n p r o p e r t y , S n o w b i r d I r o n B l o s a m time s h a r e , a n d

10

complex,

l o t 76 o f B l o o m i n g t o n C o u n t r y C l u b .

11

Plaintiff will be awarded all right, title

12

and i n t e r e s t in a n d to t h e b a l l o o n p a y m e n t t h a t ' s p a r t o f

13

t h e s a l e of t h e 4400 S o u t h S t a t e S t r e e t p r o p e r t y ,

14

the m o n t h l y p a y m e n t s .

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. LIAPIS:

17

THE COURT:

?8

MR. LIAPIS:

19

i n t e r e s t , I t h i n k it w a s .

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. LIAPIS:

Of h o w m u c h ?
$ 1 6 0 , 0 0 0 is t h e p r i n c i p a l s u m .

Due when?
With eleven and a half per cent
D u e Novei^ober o f 1 9 8 8 .
A n d w h a t ' s the p r o p e r t y ?
4400 S o u ^ h S t a t e S t r e e t .

22

t h a t w o u l d i n c l u d e the p a y m e n t of the r e g u l a r

23

p a y m e n t s o n that b a l l o o n o f $ 2 , 0 0 0 4 m o n t h .

24
25

THE COURT:
interest?

including

And

monthly

S h e ' s just a w a r d e d the s e l l e r ' s

MR. HORNE:
2

I

3

I

That's right,

MR. LIAPIS:

That's correct.

And he is

awarded, in addition, the Honeywood Condominiums at —

the

two Honeywood Condominiums.
5

I

The defendant will pay to plaintiff the

6

sum of $5,000 today, $15,000 cash in ten days, and an

7

additional $5,000.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. LIAPIS:

1

0

cash in six months.

11

$5,000 today and $15,000 when?
Ten days from today.

$5,000

Okay.

The June support payment will be considered

12

paid with the transfer of the $5,000 today.

13

will maintain the plaintiff as an owner with the defendant

14

paying the premium on a $100,000 term life insurance

15

policy, a reasonable rate policy.

16
17

THE COURT:
J

MR. LIAPIS:

THE COURT:

22

MR. LIAPIS:

25

Defendant pays the

premium.

21 I

24

With plaintiff to have

ownership, plaintiff beneficiary.

20

23

Defendant will maintain a

$100,000 life insurance policy?

18

19

The defendant

J
of the policy.

Term policy.

All right.

And he'll give us notification

You'll have to give us the policy.
Defendant will continue to obtain for the

plaintiff a new Toyota automobile at wholesale cost, and

that's wholesale to the dealer, not to the retailer to the
public, as long as that privilege is provided to him.
That means that she'll pay for the* wholesale price, but
we get the benefit of his benefits.
The parties agree that if the defendant in
any way, shape or form ever returns to an interest in the
Toyota dealership that's involved in this lawsuit, that
she'll automatically be awarded one-half interest.
No alimony to either party.

The defendant

will, within 60 days or sooner placpe a new roof on the
duplex at 1935-37 East 1700 South, at his cost and expense
through his workers.
THE COURT:

At his cost and expense?

So plaintiff will pay?
MR. HORNE:
MR. LIAPIS:
to the plaintiff.

No, defendant will pay.
Defendant will pay at no cost

Total cost to the defendant.

If there are any additional claims for
attorneys1 fees from this action by plaintiff against
defendant, she will assume and pay the balance.
THE COURT:

What do you mean?

Each party

pay their own fees and costs?
MR. LIAPIS:

After the transfer of those

cash sums we referred to earlier.
THE COURT:

So each ofj you pay their own

1

I

fees and costs?

2

MR. LIAPIS:

3

THE COURT:

Right
Then you can decide between you

4

and the clients who gets it.
5

J

MR. LIAPIS:

The parties will each assume

and pay the debts and obligations against their respective
properties that they are receiving, as well as any debts
8

|

which they have incurred in their own name since the
filing.
Defendant will further hold us harmless from

11

'

any tax obligations that result from prior joint filing

12

I

of tax returns, which I think ended with what, 1981?

10

13

MRS. HORNE:

198 2 but you haven't actually

14

'

15

I

MR. HORNE:

For 1982 I guess we still can

16

I

THE COURT:

There's no filing at this point

17

filed but you are going to file that as a joint return?

Each party will execute necessary documents?

18

MR. LIAPIS:

19

MR. HORNE:

20

Do we need to spell out that

exchange, the way we're going to set that up?

21

MR. CRANDALL:

22

|

MR. LIAPIS:

23

J

THE COURT:

24

'

25

Yes

I don't think so

We're not through
The parties are mutually

restrained from picking on each other
MR. LIAPIS:

Yes.

The defendant will further

1

be a w a r d e d a l l h i s r i g h t , title and i n t e r e s t in and to

2

his business entitled W. R. H o m e , incorporated.

3
4

THE COURT:

Each awarded own checking and

savings account?

5 I

MR. LIAPIS:

Bank accounts.

That's right.

6

Each is awarded own r e t i r e m e n t , stoctk p l a n s , e t c e t e r a ,

7

if any.

8

St. Mark's?

Don't you have some retirement benefits at

9
10

M R S . HORNE:

I d o n ' t think s o .

Working

p a r t t i m e , I d o n ' t think they p r o v i d e m e w i t h a n y .

11

MR. LIAPIS:

T h e p l a i n t i f f w i l l be awarded

12

her 1982 Toyota Cressida automobile.

13

defendant are each awarded the furniture in their

14

possession.

15
16

D e f e n d a n t w i l l be awarded the 30,000 shares
of Challenge Corporation stock, if you still have it.

77

THE COURT;

18

MR. LIAPIS:

19

THE COURT:

20

21

Plaintiff and

Defendant awarded?
Yes.
Each awarded o w n p e r s o n a l

e f f e c t s , c l o t h i n g , and all p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y in p o s s e s s i o n J
MR. LIAPIS:

A l s o , yout H o n o r , the

22

defendant has requested a further right of refusal on

23

any o f the p r o p e r t i e s a w a r d e d to the p l a i n t i f f if she

24 J

should s e l l , a t w h a t e v e r bona fide o f f e r that she's

25

r e c e i v e d o n those p r o p e r t i e s if and w h e n she p u t s it for

1

sale or puts them for sale

2
3

A 48-hour time period on that right of
refusal?

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. LIAPIS:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. LIAPIS:

How much?
Forty-eight hours.
That's not reasonable.
Sure it is.

No one is going

8

to give you an earnest money for more than two or three

9

daysf at best.

10
11

THE COURT:

But if you hit it on a Friday,

then you ought to have ten days.

12

MR. LIAPIS:

No one is going to stay on

13

an earnest money agreement. for ten days.

14

give you an offer and expect you to counter it.

15

MR. CRANDALI,:

16

probably right.

17

seven days.

Well, yes.

They're going to

I think that's

Over the weekend we would probably need

18

THE COURT:

19

[Discussion off the record.]

20

MR. CRANDALL:

21

We'll be off the record.

We want three business days,

but we'll exclude the condo.

22

MR. LIAPIS:

Is that all right?

23

MRS . HORNE:

Yes.

24

MR. LIAPIS:

Is that all right with you,

25

i

«

three business days?

l

±_

MRS. HORNE:

Yes.

MR. LIAPIS:

Your Honor, on the attorneys'

fees, we may want to spell that out.
THE COURT:

You are required to be

reasonable.
MR. CRANDALL:

We have it now that each

party bears their own attorneys1 f^es.

A large part of

this cash settlement is for attorneys1 fees, and I may
want to examine that from a tax standpoint and change that.
We may want to make it payable as alimony.
MR. LIAPIS:
MR, HORNE:

No,
The $5,d00 is alimony.

MR. LIAPIS:

No.

MR. CRANDALL:
MR. LIAPIS:

$20,000 is.

MR. CRANDALL:
fees and costs?

$25,000 of it is.
The $5,000 is hers.

So $2|0,000 of it is attorneys'

Is that the way it is?

MR. LIAPIS:

I think that's the way it was

intended.
THE COURT:
alimony, so

And it's not denominated as

~
MR. CRANDALL:
MR. LIAPIS:

No.
No.

Sc that's it.

Do you

want to ask them if they agree to that?
THE COURT:

Is that as you understand it?

11

1

MR. CRANDALL:

2

MR. HORNE:

3

Yes, your Honor.

Youfve heard everything that's

been read into the record, have you?

4

MR. HORNE:

Just as long as I get my sword,

6

THE COURT:

Do you understand it?

7

MR. HORNE:

Yes, I do.

8

THE COURT:

And you agree to be bound

10

MR. HORNE:

Yes.

11

THE COURT:

Mrs. H o m e , you have heard what f d

5

9

12

I agree.

thereby?

been read into the record?

13

MRS. HORNE:

14

THE COURT:

15

MRS. HORNE:

16

THE COURT:

17

MRS. HORNE:

18

THE COURT:

19

Yes.
And you understand it?
Yes.
You agree to be bound thereby?
Yes.
I will approve the

stipulation of settlement.

Will you draft it?

20

MR. LIAPIS:

21

[Whereupon, at the hour of 3:32 p.m., the

22
23

Yes.

Thank you, your Honor.

proceedings were concluded.]
-ooOoo-

|

24
25
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